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致股东信：1957年 （翻译完成） 

1957年股市情况回顾

在去年致股东信中我曾说到：我认为蓝筹股的估值已经高估了。如果我的判断正确，意味着不管是否低估，所有的股票价格将会大幅下跌。未来五年内，当前市场的估值被认为便宜的可能性是极小的。即使全面进入熊市，我们的套利投资价值也应该不会受到很大的影响。如果市场回落到整体低估的状态，我们的资金将会被用于普通股的投资，并且那个时候我们可能还会使用杠杆进行操作。

反之，如果股市继续大幅上涨，我们的策略是：随着收益的兑现，我们将会减少普通股的头寸，并增加套利组合的比重。这里要说明的是，以上提到的那些并不代表我非常注重市场预测，寻找严重低估的股票始终是我的首要目标。

过去一年，股市经历了温和的下跌。我之所以强调“温和”，是因为对于那些只是粗略地看新闻报道或者刚进入股市的人来说,他们很有可能误认为股市已经大幅下跌了，但事实上,在我看来,当前的商业环境下,企业盈利能力的下滑幅度要比股价跌幅大得多。公众对于整体经济前景和蓝筹股显然过于乐观。

我不去预测商业前景或市场走势。以上所述仅仅是为了打消人们认为股市已经大幅下跌或者处于低位的看法。从长期价值投资角度来看，当前市场整体仍然处于高位。

1957年的投资活动

股市的下跌提供了更多投资低估值股票的机会。所以，总的来说，相比于去年，我们的投资组合更加侧重于低估值股票投资而不是套利投资。或许有必要解释一下什么是“套利”。所谓套利，是依赖于企业的特殊行为来获得收益而不是靠股价上涨，比如企业的并购、清算、出售等。套利的风险不在于经济情况恶化或股市下跌，而在于有时候计划会被意外因素打乱，导致企业放弃预定的行动。

1956年底,我们的投资组合中普通股和套利的比例约为70:30。现在,这一比例约为85:15。过去一年,我们在两家公司中的持仓已经达到了可以参与公司决策的比例。其中一个仓位占各个合伙企业投资组合的10%至20%,另一个占比约为5%。这两项投资可能都需要三到五年的时间来实现预期目标,但目前来看,它们有望以最低风险实现较高的年均回报率。

虽然这两项投资不属于套利,但它们也很少受到股市的影响。当然,如果股市出现大幅上涨,我预计我们投资组合中的这一部分将跑输大盘。

1957年的投资成果

我们1956年成立的三家合伙企业在1957年大幅跑赢大盘。年初,道琼斯工业平均指数为499点,年末为435点,下跌了64点。如果一个人持有道琼斯指数,他将获得22点的股息,算下来全年亏损42点或者8.47%。这一亏损与大多数投资基金的表现大致相当。据我所知,没有一只投资基金在这一年的投资收益是正的。

1956年成立的三家合伙企业全年都实现了增长,年末净值分别增长约6.2%、7.8%和25%。显然,这里有个问题，在前两家合伙企业的合伙人看来,最后一家合伙企业的表现特别出色。这凸显了运气在短期内的重要性,特别是在资金到位的时间点上。第三家合伙企业成立时间最晚,当时市场处于较低水平,有几只股票特别有吸引力，正好这时候他们的资金到位了,使得我们可以在这些股票上大幅建仓。而早期成立的两家合伙企业已经基本完成了投资,因此只能在这些股票上建立相对较小的仓位。

基本上,所有合伙企业都投资于相同的股票,持仓比例也大致相同。然而,由于在初始阶段的资金到位时间不同，以及当时市场估值水平不同,因此可能造成未来几年的业绩结果也不同。多年来,我对能超出市场平均回报10%的业绩水平感到十分满意。因此,就这三家合伙企业而言,业绩优于平均水平的1957年，是成功的一年。

1957年中期,我们又成立了两家合伙企业。自它们成立以来的这段时间里,市场平均水平下跌约12%,这两家合伙企业的表现与市场平均水平大致持平。它们的投资组合现在开始接近1956年合伙企业的投资组合,未来整个集团的表现应该会更具可比性。

投资结果的解释

在某种程度上,1957年我们能获得超过平均水平的收益是因为这一年的股市整体比较差。相对而言，我们在熊市中的表现可能比在牛市中更好,所以这一年我们能表现得相对较好也是正常的。如果在大盘大幅上涨的年份中,我将非常满足于与市场平均水平持平的收益。

我可以肯定地说,我们的投资组合在1957年末的价值表现要比1956年末更好。这是由于股市处于熊市,我们有足够的时间和耐心没买入低估的股票。早些时候,我提到了我们最大的仓位,占各个合伙企业资产的10%到20%。随着时间的推移，我计划让这一仓位占所有合伙企业资产的20%,但这不能操之过急。显然,在建仓期间,我们期望所购买的股票价格保持稳定或下跌,而不是上涨。因此,在某段时间内,我们的投资组合中可能有相当一部分的收益处于停滞阶段。虽然这一策略很需要耐心,但却能最大限度地提高长期收益。

在不谈论个股的前提下，我已经尽力解释我认为你们可能感兴趣的要点,并尽可能多地分享我们的投资理念。如果您对我们运作的任何阶段有任何疑问,我将很高兴收到您的来信。

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以下是中英文对照
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The General Stock Market Picture in 1957

In last year’s letter to partners, I said the following: My view of the general market level is that it is priced above intrinsic value. This view relates to blue-chip securities. This view, if accurate, carries with it the possibility of a substantial decline in all stock prices, both undervalued and otherwise. In any event, I think the probability is very slight that current market levels will be thought of as cheap five years from now. Even a full-scale bear market, however, should not hurt the market value of our work-outs substantially. If the general market were to return to an undervalued status, our capital might be employed exclusively in general issues and perhaps some borrowed money would be used in this operation at that time.

1957年股市情况回顾

在去年致股东信中我曾说到：我认为蓝筹股的估值已经高估了。如果我的判断正确，意味着不管是否低估，所有的股票价格将会大幅下跌。未来五年内，当前市场的估值被认为便宜的可能性是极小的。即使进入全面熊市，我们的套利投资价值也应该不会受到很大的影响。如果市场回落到整体低估的状态，我们的资金将会被用于普通股的投资，并且那个时候我们可能还会使用杠杆进行操作。

Conversely, if the market should go considerably higher, our policy will be to reduce our general issues as profits present themselves and increase the work-out portfolio. All of the above is not intended to imply that market analysis is foremost in my mind. Primary attention is given at all times to the detection of substantially undervalued securities.

反之，如果股市继续大幅上涨，我们的策略是：随着收益的兑现，我们将会减少普通股的头寸，并增加套利组合的比重。这里要说明的是，以上提到的那些并不代表我非常注重市场预测，寻找严重低估的股票始终是我的首要目标。

The past year witnessed a moderate decline in stock prices. I stress the word “moderate” since casual reading of the press or conversing with those who have had only recent experience with stocks would tend to create an impression of a much greater decline. Actually, it appears to me that the decline in stock prices has been considerably less than the decline in corporate earning power under present business conditions. This means that the public is still very bullish on blue-chip stocks and the general economic picture.

过去一年，股市经历了温和的下跌。我之所以强调“温和”，是因为对于那些只是粗略地看新闻报道或者刚进入股市的人来说,他们很有可能误认为股市已经大幅下跌了，但事实上,在我看来,当前的商业环境下,企业盈利能力的下滑幅度要比股价跌幅大得多。公众对于整体经济前景和蓝筹股显然过于乐观。

I make no attempt to forecast either business or the stock market; the above is simply intended to dispel any notions that stocks have suffered any drastic decline or that the general market is at a low level. I still consider the general market to be priced on the high side based on long-term investment value.

我不去预测商业前景或市场走势。以上所述仅仅是为了打消人们认为股市已经大幅下跌或者处于低位的看法。从长期价值投资角度来看，当前市场整体仍然处于高位。

Our Activities in 1957

The market decline has created greater opportunity among undervalued situations so that, generally, our portfolio is heavier in undervalued situations relative to work-outs than it was last year. Perhaps an explanation of the term “work-out” is in order. A work-out is an investment which is dependent on a specific corporate action for its profit rather than a general advance in the price of the stock as in the case of undervalued situations. Work-outs come about through sales, mergers, liquidations, tenders, etc. In each case, the risk is that something will upset the applecart and cause the abandonment of the planned action, not that the economic picture will deteriorate and stocks decline generally.

1957年的投资活动

股市的下跌提供了更多投资低估值股票的机会。所以，总的来说，相比于去年，我们的投资组合更加侧重于低估值股票投资而不是套利投资。或许有必要解释一下什么是“套利”。所谓套利，是依赖于企业的特殊行为来获得收益而不是靠股价上涨，比如企业的并购、清算、出售等。套利的风险不在于经济情况恶化或股市下跌，而在于有时候计划会被意外因素打乱，导致企业放弃预定的行动。

At the end of 1956, we had a ratio of about 70-30 between general issues and work-outs. Now it is about 85-15. During the past year, we have taken positions in two situations which have reached a size where we may expect to take some part in corporate decisions. One of these positions accounts for between 10% and 20% of the portfolio of the various partnerships and the other accounts for about 5%. Both of these will probably take in the neighborhood of three to five years of work but they presently appear to have potential for a high average annual rate of return with a minimum of risk.

1956年底,我们的投资组合中普通股和套利的比例约为70:30。现在,这一比例约为85:15。过去一年,我们在两家公司中的持仓已经达到了可以参与公司决策的比例。其中一个仓位占各个合伙企业投资组合的10%至20%,另一个占比约为5%。这两项投资可能都需要三到五年的时间来实现预期目标,但目前来看,它们有望以最低风险实现较高的年均回报率。

While not in the classification of work-outs, they have very little dependence on the general action of the stock market. Should the general market have a substantial rise, of course, I would expect this section of our portfolio to lag behind the action of the market.

虽然这两项投资不属于套利,但它们也很少受到股市的影响。当然,如果股市出现大幅上涨,我预计我们投资组合中的这一部分将跑输大盘。

Results for 1957

In 1957, the three partnerships which we formed in 1956 did substantially better than the general market. At the beginning of the year, the Dow-Jones Industrials stood at 499 and at the end of the year it was at 435 for a loss of 64 points. If one had owned the Averages, he would have received 22 points in dividends reducing the overall loss to 42 points or 8.470% for the year. This loss is roughly equivalent to what would have been achieved by investing in most investment funds and, to my knowledge, no investment fund invested in stocks showed a gain for the year.

1957年的投资成果

我们1956年成立的三家合伙企业在1957年大幅跑赢市场。年初,道琼斯工业平均指数为499点,年末为435点,下跌了64点。如果一个人持有道琼斯指数,他将获得22点的股息,折算下来全年亏损42点或者8.47%。这一亏损与大多数投资基金的表现大致相当。据我所知,没有一只投资基金在这一年的投资收益是正的。

All three of the 1956 partnerships showed a gain during the year amounting to about 6.2%, 7.8%, and 25% on year-end 1956 net worth. Naturally, a question is created as to the vastly superior performance of the last partnership, particularly in the mind of the partners of the first two. This performance emphasizes the importance of luck in the short run, particularly in regard to when funds are received.The third partnership was started the latest in 1956 when the market was at a lower level and when several securities were particularly attractive. Because of the availability of funds, large positions were taken in these issues. Whereas the two partnerships formed earlier were already substantially invested so that they could only take relatively small positions in these issues.

1956年成立的三家合伙企业全年都实现了增长,年末净值分别增长约6.2%、7.8%和25%。显然,这里有个问题，在前两家合伙企业的合伙人看来,最后一家合伙企业的表现特别出色。这凸显了运气在短期内的重要性,特别是在资金到位的时间点上。第三家合伙企业成立时间最晚,当时市场处于较低水平,有几只股票特别有吸引力，正好这时候他们的资金到位了,使得我们可以在这些股票上大幅建仓。而早期成立的两家合伙企业已经基本完成了投资,因此只能在这些股票上建立相对较小的仓位。

Basically, all partnerships are invested in the same securities and in approximately the same percentages. However, particularly during the initial stages, money becomes available at varying times and varying levels of the market so there is more variation in results than is likely to be the case in later years. Over the years, I will be quite satisfied with a performance that is 10% per year better than the Averages, so in respect to these three partnerships, 1957 was a successful and probably better than average, year.

基本上,所有合伙企业都投资于相同的股票,持仓比例也大致相同。然而,由于在初始阶段的资金到位时间不同，以及当时市场估值水平不同,因此可能造成未来几年的业绩结果也不同。多年来,我对能超出市场平均回报10%的业绩水平感到十分满意。因此,业绩优于平均水平的1957年，对这三家合伙企业来说是成功的一年。

Two partnerships were started during the middle of 1957 and their results for the balance of the year were
roughly the same as the performance of the Averages which were down about 12% for the period since
inception of the 1957 partnerships. Their portfolios are now starting to approximate those of the 1956
partnerships and performance of the entire group should be much more comparable in the future.

1957年中期,我们又成立了两家合伙企业。自它们成立以来的这段时间里,市场平均水平下跌约12%,这两家合伙企业的表现与市场平均水平大致持平。它们的投资组合现在开始接近1956年合伙企业的投资组合,未来整个集团的表现应该会更具可比性。

Interpretation of results

To some extent our better than average performance in 1957 was due to the fact that it was a generally poor year for most stocks. Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the Averages.

投资结果的解释

在某种程度上,1957年我们能获得超过平均水平的收益是因为这一年的股市整体比较差。相对而言，我们在熊市中的表现可能比在牛市中更好,所以这一年我们能表现得相对较好也是正常的。如果在大盘大幅上涨的年份中,我将非常满足于与市场平均水平持平的收益。

I can definitely say that our portfolio represents better value at the end of 1957 than it did at the end of 1956. This is due to both generally lower prices and the fact that we have had more time to acquire the more substantially undervalued securities which can only be acquired with patience. Earlier I mentioned our largest position which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. In time I plan to have this represent 20% of the assets of all partnerships but this cannot be hurried. Obviously during any acquisition period, our primary interest is to have the stock do nothing or decline rather than advance. Therefore, at any given time, a fair proportion of our portfolio may be in the sterile stage. This policy, while requiring patience, should maximize long term profits.

我可以肯定地说,我们的投资组合在1957年末的价值表现要比1956年末更好。这是由于股市处于熊市,我们有足够的时间和耐心没买入低估的股票。早些时候,我提到了我们最大的仓位,占各个合伙企业资产的10%到20%。随着时间的推移，我计划让这一仓位占所有合伙企业资产的20%,但这不能操之过急。显然,在建仓期间,我们期望所购买的股票价格保持稳定或下跌,而不是上涨。因此,在某段时间内,我们的投资组合中可能有相当一部分的收益处于停滞阶段。虽然这一策略很需要耐心,但却能最大限度地提高长期收益。

I have tried to cover points which I felt might be of interest and disclose as much of our philosophy as may be imparted without talking of individual issues. If there are any questions concerning any phase of the operation, I would welcome hearing from you.

在不谈论个股的前提下，我已经尽力解释我认为你们可能感兴趣的要点,并尽可能多地分享我们的投资理念。如果您对我们运作的任何阶段有任何疑问,我将很高兴收到您的来信。

全文翻译完成。

#巴菲特^[20]