一边讨论投资一边瞎扯淡!

分类: 巴菲特

简美信
简美信@ealthing

2024年 4月 23日

1958年至股东信(翻译中) 

### 1958 Letter

### Warren E Buffett

### 5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska

#### THE GENERAL STOCK MARKET IN 1958

A friend who runs a medium-sized investment **trust** recently wrote: “The **mercurial** **temperament**, characteristic of the American people, produced a major transformation in 1958 and ‘**exuberant**’ would be the proper word for the stock market, at least”.

I think this summarizes the change in psychology **dominating** the stock market in 1958 at both the **amateur** and professional levels. During the past year almost any reason has been **seized** upon to **justify** “Investing” in the market. There are undoubtedly more mercurially-tempered people in the stock market now than for a good many years and the **duration** of their stay will be limited to how long they think profits can be made quickly and effortlessly. While it is impossible to **determine** how long they will continue to add numbers to their ranks and thereby **stimulate** rising prices, I believe it is **valid** to say that the longer their visit, the greater the reaction from it.

I make no attempt to forecast the general market – my efforts are **devoted** to finding undervalued securities. However, I do believe that widespread public belief in the **inevitability** of profits from investment in stocks will lead to **eventual** trouble. Should this occur, prices, but not intrinsic values in my opinion, of even undervalued securities can be expected to be substantially affected.

#### 1958 年股市情况

一位管理着中等规模投资信托的朋友最近在信中提到:“美国人那种典型的多变的特性在1958年发生了重大转变,用‘狂热’来描述当年的股市或许更为恰当”。

我认为这句话很好地概括了 1958 年股市投资者的心理变化,不管是普通投资者还是专业人士都受到了影响。在过去一年中,人们几乎抓住一切机会来为投资股市找理由。显然,现在股市中情绪化的投资者比往年更多,他们在股市中停留的时长将取决于他们认为能够多快且不费力地获得收益。尽管我们无法预知这种情绪化投资的热潮将持续多久,但可以肯定的是,这种趋势持续得越久,最终可能引发的市场反应也会越激烈。

我不预测股市的走势——只专注于寻找低估的股票。然而,我确实担心,公众普遍认为投资股票就能稳赚不赔的观念,最终可能会引发问题。如果这种情况真的发生,股价,即使是那些低估的股票,他们的价格都会受到巨大的影响,但是它们的内在价值不会因此而改变。

### RESULTS IN 1958

In my letter of last year, I wrote:

“Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be **tempered** by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively will. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages.”

The latter sentence describes the type of year we had in 1958 and my forecast worked out. The Dow-Jones Industrial average advanced from 435 to 583 which, after adding back dividends of about 20 points, gave an **overall** gain of 38.5% from the Dow-Jones unit. The five partnerships that operated throughout the entire year obtained results averaging slightly better than this 38.5%. Based on market values at the end of both years, their gains ranged from 36.7% to 46.2%. Considering the fact that a substantial **portion** of assets has been and still is invested in securities, which benefit very little from a fast-rising market, I believe these results are **reasonably** good. I will continue to forecast that our results will be above average in a declining or level market, but it will be all we can do to keep pace with a rising market.

#### 1958 年的成果

在去年的信件中,我曾提及:

“我们的业绩在熊市中往往比在牛市表现更好。因此,我们表现出色是应该的。在股市大幅上涨的年份,如果能够获得与市场平均回报水平持平的业绩,我就非常满意了。”

后面一句话恰好描述了 1958 年的市场状况,我的预测得以证实。道琼斯工业平均指数从 435 点攀升至 583 点,再加上大约20点的股息,道琼斯指数收益达到了 38.5%。五家合伙企业所取得的平均成果略高于这一数字。根据年初和年末的市场价格,他们的收益率介于 36.7% 至 46.2% 之间。鉴于我们有相当一部分资金是在快速上涨的股市中投资的,收益比较低,所以我认为今年总体的成果是相当不错的。我的观点仍然不变,在下跌或平稳股市中,我们的业绩将高于平均水平;而在股市上升时,我们的目标是至少能够跟上股市的增长步伐。

#### TYPICAL SITUATION

So that you may better understand our method of operation, I think it would be well to review a specific activity of 1958. Last year I referred to our largest holding which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. I pointed out that it was to our interest to have this stock decline or remain relatively steady, so that we could acquire an even larger position and that for this reason such a security would probably hold back our comparative performance in a bull market.

This stock was the Commonwealth Trust Co. of Union City, New Jersey. At the time we started to purchase the stock, it had an intrinsic value $125 per share computed on a conservative basis. However, for good reasons, it

   4paid no cash dividend at all despite earnings of about $10 per share which was largely responsible for a depressed price of about $50 per share. So here we had a very well managed bank with substantial earnings power selling at a large discount from intrinsic value. Management was friendly to us as new stockholders and risk of any ultimate loss seemed minimal.

Commonwealth was 25.5% owned by a larger bank (Commonwealth had assets of about $50 Million – about half the size of the First National in Omaha), which had desired a merger for many years. Such a merger was prevented for persona1 reasons, but there was evidence that this situation would not continue indefinitely. Thus we had a combination of:

1. Very strong defensive characteristics;

2. Good solid value building up at a satisfactory pace and;

3. Evidence to the effect that eventually this value would be unlocked although it might be one year or ten

years. If the latter were true, the value would presumably have been built up to a considerably larger figure, say, $250 per share.

Over a period of a year or so, we were successful in obtaining about 12% of the bank at a price averaging about $51 per share. Obviously it was definitely to our advantage to have the stock remain dormant in price. Our block of stock increased in value as its size grew, particularly after we became the second largest stockholder with sufficient voting power to warrant consultation on any merger proposal.

Commonwealth only had about 300 stockholders and probably averaged two trades or so per month, so you can understand why I say that the activity of the stock market generally had very little effect on the price movement of some of our holdings.

Unfortunately we did run into some competition on buying, which railed the price to about $65 where we were neither buyer nor seller. Very small buying orders can create price changes of this magnitude in an inactive stock, which explains the importance of not having any “Leakage” regarding our portfolio holdings.

Late in the year we were successful in finding a special situation where we could become the largest holder at an attractive price, so we sold our block of Commonwealth obtaining $80 per share although the quoted market was about 20% lower at the time.

It is obvious that we could still be sitting with $50 stock patiently buying in dribs and drabs, and I would be quite happy with such a program although our performance relative to the market last year would have looked poor. The year when a situation such at Commonwealth results in a realized profit is, to a great extent, fortuitous. Thus, our performance for any single year has serious limitations as a basis for estimating long term results. However, I believe that a program of investing in such undervalued well protected securities offers the surest means of long term profits in securities.

I might mention that the buyer of the stock at $80 can expect to do quite well over the years. However, the relative undervaluation at $80 with an intrinsic value $135 is quite different from a price $50 with an intrinsic value of $125, and it seemed to me that our capital could better be employed in the situation which replaced it. This new situation is somewhat larger than Commonwealth and represents about 25% of the assets of the various partnerships. While the degree of undervaluation is no greater than in many other securities we own (or even than some) we are the largest stockholder and this has substantial advantages many times in determining the length of time required to correct the undervaluation. In this particular holding we are virtually assured of a performance better than that of the Dow-Jones for the period we hold it.

#### THE CURRENT SITUATION

The higher the level of the market, the fewer the undervalued securities and I am finding some difficulty in securing an adequate number of attractive investments. I would prefer to increase the percentage of our assets in work-outs, but these are very difficult to find on the right terms.

To the extent possible, therefore, I am attempting to create my own work-outs by acquiring large positions in several undervalued securities. Such a policy should lead to the fulfillment of my earlier forecast – an above average performance in a bear market. It is on this basis that I hope to be judged. If you have any questions, feel free to ask them.

WARREN E. BUFFETT 2-11-59

2024年 4月 23日 15 1
简美信
简美信@ealthing

2024年 4月 8日

致股东信:1957年 (翻译完成) 

1957年股市情况回顾

在去年致股东信中我曾说到:我认为蓝筹股的估值已经高估了。如果我的判断正确,意味着不管是否低估,所有的股票价格将会大幅下跌。未来五年内,当前市场的估值被认为便宜的可能性是极小的。即使全面进入熊市,我们的套利投资价值也应该不会受到很大的影响。如果市场回落到整体低估的状态,我们的资金将会被用于普通股的投资,并且那个时候我们可能还会使用杠杆进行操作。

反之,如果股市继续大幅上涨,我们的策略是:随着收益的兑现,我们将会减少普通股的头寸,并增加套利组合的比重。这里要说明的是,以上提到的那些并不代表我非常注重市场预测,寻找严重低估的股票始终是我的首要目标。

过去一年,股市经历了温和的下跌。我之所以强调“温和”,是因为对于那些只是粗略地看新闻报道或者刚进入股市的人来说,他们很有可能误认为股市已经大幅下跌了,但事实上,在我看来,当前的商业环境下,企业盈利能力的下滑幅度要比股价跌幅大得多。公众对于整体经济前景和蓝筹股显然过于乐观。

我不去预测商业前景或市场走势。以上所述仅仅是为了打消人们认为股市已经大幅下跌或者处于低位的看法。从长期价值投资角度来看,当前市场整体仍然处于高位。

1957年的投资活动

股市的下跌提供了更多投资低估值股票的机会。所以,总的来说,相比于去年,我们的投资组合更加侧重于低估值股票投资而不是套利投资。或许有必要解释一下什么是“套利”。所谓套利,是依赖于企业的特殊行为来获得收益而不是靠股价上涨,比如企业的并购、清算、出售等。套利的风险不在于经济情况恶化或股市下跌,而在于有时候计划会被意外因素打乱,导致企业放弃预定的行动。

1956年底,我们的投资组合中普通股和套利的比例约为70:30。现在,这一比例约为85:15。过去一年,我们在两家公司中的持仓已经达到了可以参与公司决策的比例。其中一个仓位占各个合伙企业投资组合的10%至20%,另一个占比约为5%。这两项投资可能都需要三到五年的时间来实现预期目标,但目前来看,它们有望以最低风险实现较高的年均回报率。

虽然这两项投资不属于套利,但它们也很少受到股市的影响。当然,如果股市出现大幅上涨,我预计我们投资组合中的这一部分将跑输大盘。

1957年的投资成果

我们1956年成立的三家合伙企业在1957年大幅跑赢大盘。年初,道琼斯工业平均指数为499点,年末为435点,下跌了64点。如果一个人持有道琼斯指数,他将获得22点的股息,算下来全年亏损42点或者8.47%。这一亏损与大多数投资基金的表现大致相当。据我所知,没有一只投资基金在这一年的投资收益是正的。

1956年成立的三家合伙企业全年都实现了增长,年末净值分别增长约6.2%、7.8%和25%。显然,这里有个问题,在前两家合伙企业的合伙人看来,最后一家合伙企业的表现特别出色。这凸显了运气在短期内的重要性,特别是在资金到位的时间点上。第三家合伙企业成立时间最晚,当时市场处于较低水平,有几只股票特别有吸引力,正好这时候他们的资金到位了,使得我们可以在这些股票上大幅建仓。而早期成立的两家合伙企业已经基本完成了投资,因此只能在这些股票上建立相对较小的仓位。

基本上,所有合伙企业都投资于相同的股票,持仓比例也大致相同。然而,由于在初始阶段的资金到位时间不同,以及当时市场估值水平不同,因此可能造成未来几年的业绩结果也不同。多年来,我对能超出市场平均回报10%的业绩水平感到十分满意。因此,就这三家合伙企业而言,业绩优于平均水平的1957年,是成功的一年。

1957年中期,我们又成立了两家合伙企业。自它们成立以来的这段时间里,市场平均水平下跌约12%,这两家合伙企业的表现与市场平均水平大致持平。它们的投资组合现在开始接近1956年合伙企业的投资组合,未来整个集团的表现应该会更具可比性。

投资结果的解释

在某种程度上,1957年我们能获得超过平均水平的收益是因为这一年的股市整体比较差。相对而言,我们在熊市中的表现可能比在牛市中更好,所以这一年我们能表现得相对较好也是正常的。如果在大盘大幅上涨的年份中,我将非常满足于与市场平均水平持平的收益。

我可以肯定地说,我们的投资组合在1957年末的价值表现要比1956年末更好。这是由于股市处于熊市,我们有足够的时间和耐心没买入低估的股票。早些时候,我提到了我们最大的仓位,占各个合伙企业资产的10%到20%。随着时间的推移,我计划让这一仓位占所有合伙企业资产的20%,但这不能操之过急。显然,在建仓期间,我们期望所购买的股票价格保持稳定或下跌,而不是上涨。因此,在某段时间内,我们的投资组合中可能有相当一部分的收益处于停滞阶段。虽然这一策略很需要耐心,但却能最大限度地提高长期收益。

在不谈论个股的前提下,我已经尽力解释我认为你们可能感兴趣的要点,并尽可能多地分享我们的投资理念。如果您对我们运作的任何阶段有任何疑问,我将很高兴收到您的来信。

==============================
以下是中英文对照
==============================

The General Stock Market Picture in 1957

In last year’s letter to partners, I said the following: My view of the general market level is that it is priced above intrinsic value. This view relates to blue-chip securities. This view, if accurate, carries with it the possibility of a substantial decline in all stock prices, both undervalued and otherwise. In any event, I think the probability is very slight that current market levels will be thought of as cheap five years from now. Even a full-scale bear market, however, should not hurt the market value of our work-outs substantially. If the general market were to return to an undervalued status, our capital might be employed exclusively in general issues and perhaps some borrowed money would be used in this operation at that time.

1957年股市情况回顾

在去年致股东信中我曾说到:我认为蓝筹股的估值已经高估了。如果我的判断正确,意味着不管是否低估,所有的股票价格将会大幅下跌。未来五年内,当前市场的估值被认为便宜的可能性是极小的。即使进入全面熊市,我们的套利投资价值也应该不会受到很大的影响。如果市场回落到整体低估的状态,我们的资金将会被用于普通股的投资,并且那个时候我们可能还会使用杠杆进行操作。

Conversely, if the market should go considerably higher, our policy will be to reduce our general issues as profits present themselves and increase the work-out portfolio. All of the above is not intended to imply that market analysis is foremost in my mind. Primary attention is given at all times to the detection of substantially undervalued securities.

反之,如果股市继续大幅上涨,我们的策略是:随着收益的兑现,我们将会减少普通股的头寸,并增加套利组合的比重。这里要说明的是,以上提到的那些并不代表我非常注重市场预测,寻找严重低估的股票始终是我的首要目标。

The past year witnessed a moderate decline in stock prices. I stress the word “moderate” since casual reading of the press or conversing with those who have had only recent experience with stocks would tend to create an impression of a much greater decline. Actually, it appears to me that the decline in stock prices has been considerably less than the decline in corporate earning power under present business conditions. This means that the public is still very bullish on blue-chip stocks and the general economic picture.

过去一年,股市经历了温和的下跌。我之所以强调“温和”,是因为对于那些只是粗略地看新闻报道或者刚进入股市的人来说,他们很有可能误认为股市已经大幅下跌了,但事实上,在我看来,当前的商业环境下,企业盈利能力的下滑幅度要比股价跌幅大得多。公众对于整体经济前景和蓝筹股显然过于乐观。

I make no attempt to forecast either business or the stock market; the above is simply intended to dispel any notions that stocks have suffered any drastic decline or that the general market is at a low level. I still consider the general market to be priced on the high side based on long-term investment value.

我不去预测商业前景或市场走势。以上所述仅仅是为了打消人们认为股市已经大幅下跌或者处于低位的看法。从长期价值投资角度来看,当前市场整体仍然处于高位。

Our Activities in 1957

The market decline has created greater opportunity among undervalued situations so that, generally, our portfolio is heavier in undervalued situations relative to work-outs than it was last year. Perhaps an explanation of the term “work-out” is in order. A work-out is an investment which is dependent on a specific corporate action for its profit rather than a general advance in the price of the stock as in the case of undervalued situations. Work-outs come about through sales, mergers, liquidations, tenders, etc. In each case, the risk is that something will upset the applecart and cause the abandonment of the planned action, not that the economic picture will deteriorate and stocks decline generally.

1957年的投资活动

股市的下跌提供了更多投资低估值股票的机会。所以,总的来说,相比于去年,我们的投资组合更加侧重于低估值股票投资而不是套利投资。或许有必要解释一下什么是“套利”。所谓套利,是依赖于企业的特殊行为来获得收益而不是靠股价上涨,比如企业的并购、清算、出售等。套利的风险不在于经济情况恶化或股市下跌,而在于有时候计划会被意外因素打乱,导致企业放弃预定的行动。

At the end of 1956, we had a ratio of about 70-30 between general issues and work-outs. Now it is about 85-15. During the past year, we have taken positions in two situations which have reached a size where we may expect to take some part in corporate decisions. One of these positions accounts for between 10% and 20% of the portfolio of the various partnerships and the other accounts for about 5%. Both of these will probably take in the neighborhood of three to five years of work but they presently appear to have potential for a high average annual rate of return with a minimum of risk.

1956年底,我们的投资组合中普通股和套利的比例约为70:30。现在,这一比例约为85:15。过去一年,我们在两家公司中的持仓已经达到了可以参与公司决策的比例。其中一个仓位占各个合伙企业投资组合的10%至20%,另一个占比约为5%。这两项投资可能都需要三到五年的时间来实现预期目标,但目前来看,它们有望以最低风险实现较高的年均回报率。

While not in the classification of work-outs, they have very little dependence on the general action of the stock market. Should the general market have a substantial rise, of course, I would expect this section of our portfolio to lag behind the action of the market.

虽然这两项投资不属于套利,但它们也很少受到股市的影响。当然,如果股市出现大幅上涨,我预计我们投资组合中的这一部分将跑输大盘。

Results for 1957

In 1957, the three partnerships which we formed in 1956 did substantially better than the general market. At the beginning of the year, the Dow-Jones Industrials stood at 499 and at the end of the year it was at 435 for a loss of 64 points. If one had owned the Averages, he would have received 22 points in dividends reducing the overall loss to 42 points or 8.470% for the year. This loss is roughly equivalent to what would have been achieved by investing in most investment funds and, to my knowledge, no investment fund invested in stocks showed a gain for the year.

1957年的投资成果

我们1956年成立的三家合伙企业在1957年大幅跑赢市场。年初,道琼斯工业平均指数为499点,年末为435点,下跌了64点。如果一个人持有道琼斯指数,他将获得22点的股息,折算下来全年亏损42点或者8.47%。这一亏损与大多数投资基金的表现大致相当。据我所知,没有一只投资基金在这一年的投资收益是正的。

All three of the 1956 partnerships showed a gain during the year amounting to about 6.2%, 7.8%, and 25% on year-end 1956 net worth. Naturally, a question is created as to the vastly superior performance of the last partnership, particularly in the mind of the partners of the first two. This performance emphasizes the importance of luck in the short run, particularly in regard to when funds are received.The third partnership was started the latest in 1956 when the market was at a lower level and when several securities were particularly attractive. Because of the availability of funds, large positions were taken in these issues. Whereas the two partnerships formed earlier were already substantially invested so that they could only take relatively small positions in these issues.

1956年成立的三家合伙企业全年都实现了增长,年末净值分别增长约6.2%、7.8%和25%。显然,这里有个问题,在前两家合伙企业的合伙人看来,最后一家合伙企业的表现特别出色。这凸显了运气在短期内的重要性,特别是在资金到位的时间点上。第三家合伙企业成立时间最晚,当时市场处于较低水平,有几只股票特别有吸引力,正好这时候他们的资金到位了,使得我们可以在这些股票上大幅建仓。而早期成立的两家合伙企业已经基本完成了投资,因此只能在这些股票上建立相对较小的仓位。

Basically, all partnerships are invested in the same securities and in approximately the same percentages. However, particularly during the initial stages, money becomes available at varying times and varying levels of the market so there is more variation in results than is likely to be the case in later years. Over the years, I will be quite satisfied with a performance that is 10% per year better than the Averages, so in respect to these three partnerships, 1957 was a successful and probably better than average, year.

基本上,所有合伙企业都投资于相同的股票,持仓比例也大致相同。然而,由于在初始阶段的资金到位时间不同,以及当时市场估值水平不同,因此可能造成未来几年的业绩结果也不同。多年来,我对能超出市场平均回报10%的业绩水平感到十分满意。因此,业绩优于平均水平的1957年,对这三家合伙企业来说是成功的一年。

Two partnerships were started during the middle of 1957 and their results for the balance of the year were
roughly the same as the performance of the Averages which were down about 12% for the period since
inception of the 1957 partnerships. Their portfolios are now starting to approximate those of the 1956
partnerships and performance of the entire group should be much more comparable in the future.

1957年中期,我们又成立了两家合伙企业。自它们成立以来的这段时间里,市场平均水平下跌约12%,这两家合伙企业的表现与市场平均水平大致持平。它们的投资组合现在开始接近1956年合伙企业的投资组合,未来整个集团的表现应该会更具可比性。

Interpretation of results

To some extent our better than average performance in 1957 was due to the fact that it was a generally poor year for most stocks. Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the Averages.

投资结果的解释

在某种程度上,1957年我们能获得超过平均水平的收益是因为这一年的股市整体比较差。相对而言,我们在熊市中的表现可能比在牛市中更好,所以这一年我们能表现得相对较好也是正常的。如果在大盘大幅上涨的年份中,我将非常满足于与市场平均水平持平的收益。

I can definitely say that our portfolio represents better value at the end of 1957 than it did at the end of 1956. This is due to both generally lower prices and the fact that we have had more time to acquire the more substantially undervalued securities which can only be acquired with patience. Earlier I mentioned our largest position which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. In time I plan to have this represent 20% of the assets of all partnerships but this cannot be hurried. Obviously during any acquisition period, our primary interest is to have the stock do nothing or decline rather than advance. Therefore, at any given time, a fair proportion of our portfolio may be in the sterile stage. This policy, while requiring patience, should maximize long term profits.

我可以肯定地说,我们的投资组合在1957年末的价值表现要比1956年末更好。这是由于股市处于熊市,我们有足够的时间和耐心没买入低估的股票。早些时候,我提到了我们最大的仓位,占各个合伙企业资产的10%到20%。随着时间的推移,我计划让这一仓位占所有合伙企业资产的20%,但这不能操之过急。显然,在建仓期间,我们期望所购买的股票价格保持稳定或下跌,而不是上涨。因此,在某段时间内,我们的投资组合中可能有相当一部分的收益处于停滞阶段。虽然这一策略很需要耐心,但却能最大限度地提高长期收益。

I have tried to cover points which I felt might be of interest and disclose as much of our philosophy as may be imparted without talking of individual issues. If there are any questions concerning any phase of the operation, I would welcome hearing from you.

在不谈论个股的前提下,我已经尽力解释我认为你们可能感兴趣的要点,并尽可能多地分享我们的投资理念。如果您对我们运作的任何阶段有任何疑问,我将很高兴收到您的来信。

全文翻译完成。

#[20]
2024年 4月 8日 55 2
  • 简美信

    2024年 4月 10日

    27岁的巴菲特管理的基金规模就已经可以做到影响上市公司管理层决策的程度,27岁啊,真的是天才

    Safari iPhone iPhone OS 17
简美信
简美信@ealthing

2023年 2月 26日

2022巴菲特致股东信(更新中) 

2023年巴菲特发布了2022年致股东的信,在网上看了一些人的翻译,要么是机器翻译的,要么就是翻译得拗口,要么就是翻译得词不达意,所以我决定自己翻译一次。翻译的原则:1.忠实原文的本意。2.基于巴菲特思想和风格翻译。3.融会贯通全文,进行通顺易于理解的翻译。所以在看到译文时,你可能在一些地方与原英文不完全对得上,多数情况是多了一点,这是因为我基于巴菲特的思想内容进行了补充翻译,但是如果你仔细反复推敲原文和译文以及巴菲特思想就能理解为什么这么翻译,并且赞同应该这么翻译。

本翻译文可以分享但不支持转载。由于是对逐句反复推敲翻译,加上本人水平有限时间有限,所以不能一次翻译完成,争取2天内完成翻译。后期有时间我再发一篇逐句原文对照的翻译。

伯克希尔哈撒韦公司

致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东们:

我和查理·芒格,肩负着管理大量个人投资的重任。我们感谢他们持续的信任,这种信任贯穿了他们一生中的大部分时间。当我写这封信时,我心中首先想到的是这些忠实的投资者。

通常情况下,人们在年轻时选择储蓄,期望以此来维持退休后的生活水平。死后将遗产留给他们的家人、朋友或慈善机构。

我们的观念有所不同。我们认为伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的个人持股者大多属于终身投资的类型。这些人不仅自己生活得很好,而且最终会把大部分资金通过捐赠给慈善机构的方式来改善其他人的生活。这种方式,结果可能是惊人的。

对金钱的不同态度展示了不同的人性。查理和我感到非常欣慰的是,伯克希尔向公共领域捐献了巨大的财富,而且我们的股东也很少做炫耀财富、建立家族王朝之类事情。

谁会不愿意为我们这样的股东工作呢?

我们做了什么

我和查理将你们在伯克希尔的资产按照两种所有权的形式进行资本投资。 首先,我们投资于我们控股的企业,通常是100%控股的企业。伯克希尔指导这些子公司的资本配置,并为他们挑选合适的CEO。当管理大型企业时,信任和规则都是必不可少的。伯克希尔对所挑选的CEO极其信任,——甚至到了有些人会说是极端的程度。失望是难免的。我们理解商业决策有时会做错,但对于个人的不端行为则毫不容忍。

在我们第二种所有权投资中,我们通过购买公开交易的股票来被动地持有一些企业的部分股权。持有这些投资时,我们对该企业的管理层没有决策权。

无论是哪种所有权投资,我们的目标都是在拥有可持续商业模式及值得信赖管理层的企业中进行有效投资。请特别注意,我们对公开市场中的企业股权投资都是基于对它们长期业绩的表现,而不是把他们当作短期交易的对象。这一点至关重要:查理和我不是查找股票的高手;我们是挑选企业的高手!

多年来,我犯了很多错误。因此,我们现在的投资组合中除了少数几家具有优秀商业模式和业绩表现的企业,还有很多不怎么样的企业。在此过程中,我曾投资过的一些企业已经倒闭了,因为它们生产出来的产品被公众所抛弃! 资本具有两面性:不断产生失败者的同时也不断带来改进的商品和服务,这种现象被奥地利经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特 (Joseph Schumpeter)称为 ‘创造性破坏'(creative destruction)

* * * * * * * * * * *

我们公开交易的部分有一个优势,那就是——偶尔——我们可以以非常优惠的价格买到优秀企业的股票。重要的是要明白,股票经常以非常愚蠢的价格交易,无论是高还是低。“有效”市场只存在于教科书中。事实上,市场交易中的股票债券价的格波动总是令人费解,通常只有事后回顾才知道原因。

控股性企业则是另一种类型。它们有时会以远高于合理估值的价格出售,但几乎从不出现廉价估值。除非处于危机之中,否则控股性企业的所有者不会考虑以恐慌式估值出售。

在这方面,我的成绩还过得去:在管理伯克希尔的58年中,我的大部分投资决策都一般般。在某些情况下,我也会做出错误的投资,好在运气不错,挽回了局面。(还记得我们从美国航空和所罗门公司几乎灾难性地逃脱吗?我当然记得。)

我们令人满意的成绩是由大约十几个真正好的决策所产生——大概平均5年一个——这是一个对像伯克希尔这样的长期投资者有利的有时会被遗忘的优势。

让我们来看看这背后都发生了什么:

神秘的投资

1994年8月——没错,是1994年——伯克希尔哈撒韦公司完成了为期七年的可口可乐股票购买计划,我们现在拥有4亿股。总成本是13亿美元——这对那时的伯克希尔来说是一笔非常大的投资。

1994年我们从可口可乐收到7500万美元的股息。到了2022年,股息增加到了7.04亿美元。每年都在增长,就像生日一样确定。查理和我所需要做的就是兑现可口可乐每季度发给我们的股息支票。我们预计股息很有可能会继续增长。

美国运通也是类似的故事。伯克希尔对美国运通的购买基本上在1995年完成,很巧,也是花了13亿美元。这项投资收到的年度股息从4100万美元增长到了3.02亿美元。这些股息也很有可能会继续增长。

这些股息收益虽然令人高兴,但更重要是它们的利润增长推动了股价上涨。**在年底,我们的可口可乐股票价值为250亿美元,美国运通的股票价值为220亿美元。他们在伯克希尔净值中都分别占比约5%,与当初的持仓占比差不多。

假如我在90年代也犯了一个类似投资规模的错误,一个直到2022年价值没有任何变化、只保持了13亿美元价值的错误。(例如买了30年期高等级债券)。那个令人失望的投资现在只占伯克希尔净值不足0.3%的比例,并且每年只能给我们提供8000万左右不变的收入。

对投资者们的启示:杂草会随着鲜花的盛开而逐渐变得渺小。只需要几个优秀的投资,随着时间推移,就能创造奇迹。当然,早点开始并活到90多岁对投资也有帮助。

#[20]
2023年 2月 26日 250
  • 简美信

    2023年 2月 26日

    更新了一段,还有四大段没翻译

    Chrome Windows 10

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